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The rapid growth of deposits in New York City over the three decades following the Civil War is often
attributed to the release of pent-up demand for the services that transactions accounts could provide.
I advance a complementary explanation that centers on the existence of an increasingly efficient market
for bank shares. The stock market was important because it generated price and dividend quotations
that signaled depositors about the soundness of individual banks, thereby directing the expansion.
At the same time, innovations within the city’s banks created conditions under which stock prices
became more informative, reducing asymmetries between banks and depositors to a point where confidence
in banks could grow.  Using a new database of stock prices, dividends, and balance sheet items for
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1 The available banking aggregates for the nation as a whole, including state-chartered and
national banks, are from the Historical Statistics of the United States (Carter et al., 2006, Vol. 3,
series Cj155 and Cj157, pp. 633-4, and series Cj209 and Cj211, p. 641). These data  indicate that
$560 million in capital supported $758 million in deposits nationally in 1866 and that deposits
grew more than seven-fold by 1896 to $5.5 billion with capital more than tripling to $1.75
billion. Average annual growth rates of real GDP per capita are computed for 1866-97 from
Historical Statistics (Carter et al., 2006, Vol. 3, series Ca11, pp. 24-5, “Millennial Edition
Series”). Alternate estimates from Berry (1988, table 8, p. 24) suggest that annual growth was
closer to 2 percent. 
     
2  These channels include mobilizing otherwise unproductive resources (e.g., Gurley and
Shaw 1955; Bencivenga and Smith 1991) and applying them to high-return projects (e.g.,
McKinnon 1973; Greenwood and Jovanovic 1990; King and Levine 1993), or improving risk-
sharing arrangements among borrowers and lenders (Diamond 1984).
1
I. Introduction
By any standard, the spread of deposit banking in New York City over the three decades
following the Civil War was nothing short of remarkable. With $90 million of capital available
in 1866 to support $200 million in individual deposits, the members of the New York Clearing
House Association tripled their deposits by 1897 as capital fell to $72 million. As Fig. 1 depicts,
the fresh deposits fueled a surge in lending activity. The aggregated balance sheet figures for the
entire United States are even more striking, and their implications for growth in real per capita
incomes, which averaged 1.7 percent over the 1866-1897 period, have been a subject of
considerable empirical interest (see Sylla 1969; James 1978; Rousseau and Wachtel 1998).
1 
Such inquiries are strengthened by a body of economic theory that identifies channels through
which deepening in banking and financial markets may promote long-run growth.
2  In this paper,
rather than focusing on aggregate growth, I examine how the existence and widening of the
market for bank equities encouraged and directed the expansion of deposits in the nation’s 19th
century financial center. 
In an earlier treatment, Rousseau (1998) showed that improvements in the screening and 2
Fig. 1.  Loans, individual deposits, and authorized capital of traded New York
City banks, 1865-1897. Source: The Commercial and Financial Chronicle,
various issues.
monitoring of bank loans after 1870 contributed to lower interest rates on loans and higher
interest rates on deposit in New York City’s increasingly competitive banking sector, and that
this in turn increased throughput by attracting loan applications and fresh deposits. In light of 
these findings, it is important to our understanding of how financial institutions evolve to
consider the efficiency with which information reached the public to affect both the size of the
deposit base and its distribution across banks in the nation’s largest central reserve city.  I
propose that an efficient market for banking capital contributed to the unbalanced deposit growth
that the data show among New York banks by signaling individual depositors about the
condition of particular institutions.  In turn, depositors looked to these price signals rather than to
more easily manipulated balance sheet quantities when deciding where to place their surpluses.3
Since demandable debt emerged in the United States early in the 19th century and in
theory possesses the desirable feature of aligning the interests of bankers and less-informed
depositors through a threat of liquidation (Calomiris and Kahn 1991), its slow adoption was
likely to have resulted from informational frictions that remained quite severe prior to the Civil
War.  My hypothesis suggests that institutional changes among New York City banks after 1870,
including moves toward greater efficiency and transparency, increased public confidence in the
safety of demand deposits.  At a time when bank stock prices were generally trending upward
but varied widely across individual banks, confidence in the informational content of the equity
market was instrumental in generating a price elasticity of deposits large enough to direct the
path of the expansion. 
The proposition implies that the trading of common stocks had become such an integral
part of New York’s postbellum landscape that individuals who did not invest directly in bank
stocks could access price information from the press and thus, both directly and indirectly, from
the city’s growing community of finance professionals. This was certainly the case in New York,
where the practice of stock trading had developed more rapidly since 1800 than in any other
nation or epoch in history, with bank stocks leading the way (Rousseau and Sylla 2005).
To facilitate testing of this hypothesis, I have constructed a new bank-level data set
containing  annual observations of prices, dividends, and balance sheet quantities from the
Commercial and Financial Chronicle, the New York Times, and the Annual Report of the
Comptroller of the Currency.  The data, which cover 1866 through 1897 –  the period when
deposits grew most rapidly – allow construction of price indexes and dividend yields for New
York City’s traded banks.  More important, they offer an opportunity to trace and compare the
dynamic responses of deposits to fluctuations in bank stock prices as well as various accounting       3 There were 1,466 state banks in operation when the first National Banking Act was passed in
1863, and this number fell to 1,089 by mid-1864, to 349 by mid-1865, and to only 247 by mid-
1868 (Carter et al., 2006, Vol. 3, series Cj149, p. 633).
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measures of bank performance. 
The empirical analysis, which uses the generalized method of moments techniques of
Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988) and Arellano and Bond (1991) to estimate dynamic panel  models of
deposit adjustment, finds that individuals did indeed place their surpluses in banks with strong
price performance.  At the same time, institutional depositors, who likely had better  information
about the soundness of potential correspondent banks, relied less upon prices.  Neither type of
depositor seems to have responded vigorously to signals that were regularly available from
published balance sheets, such as a bank’s surplus and undivided profits.
.    My emphasis on the equity market in explaining the rise of deposit banking in New York
City seems somewhat removed from traditional legislative explanations for the rise of deposits in
the nation as a whole. For example, when Congress announced a prohibitive 10 percent tax on
the notes of state-chartered banks to take effect on July 1, 1866, state banks were left to choose
between exiting the industry altogether, converting to national charters (with which they could
continue to issue notes), or relying on deposits as an alternative means of funding earning
assets.
3  Deposits did not rise immediately, however, because most state banks quickly converted
to national charters. But a prohibition on mortgage lending included in the National Banking
Acts and decreasing profitability of note issue due to rising prices of collateral bonds led to a
resurgence of state banks by 1880.  At the same time, deposits expanded as individuals grew
more accustomed to check money and to the liquidity and transactions services that deposit
accounts could provide (Sylla 1969, p. 663). 
But legislative factors were much less at play in New York City where most banks had5
converted to national charters by 1866 and the return of state banking seen elsewhere after 1880
did not materialize. As the nation’s only central reserve city under the National Banking laws
until 1887, when St. Louis and Chicago were also designated, New York did of course see large
inflows of interbank deposits from elsewhere in the nation (see James and Weiman 2010a,
2010b), but the evidence presented here suggests that these deposits were much less stock-price
elastic than those placed by individuals. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the evolution of the postbellum
market for New York bank stocks. Section 3 reviews the empirical methodology. Section 4
establishes that medium-term price movements provided important information to depositors in
choosing among deposit banks and predicted changes in the distribution of deposits more
effectively than fundamental balance sheet items. Section 5 concludes.
2. The market for banking equities in New York City
2.1. Overview
The market for U.S. bank stocks made a strong start in 1791 with what in retrospect
stands as the nation’s most successful initial public offering – that of the First Bank of the United
States.  As individual states proceeded to grant special charters to more than 800 banks over the
next five decades, the transfer of bank shares became familiar transactions in the money centers
of New York, Boston, Philadelphia and Baltimore. Rousseau and Sylla (2005) report that the
number of New York City banks with price quotations in the local newspapers rose from only
three in 1800 to 25 in 1825 and 36 by 1850.  Issues of the Commercial and Financial Chronicle
show that this growth continued unabated through the turn of the twentieth century, with the
number of bank listings rising to 46 by 1866 to 50 in 1880 and 79 by 1897. 6
Banks were among the more frequently quoted stocks in the early years of the NYSE and
comprised more than 50 percent of total listings as late as 1856, but the stock market itself
remained relatively small.  By 1870, however, investment bankers had turned away from bank
stocks, a large portion of which were held by institutional investors, in favor of riskier but
higher-return railroad securities.  Trades of bank stocks on the NYSE continued to appear on the
official daily listings throughout the 1866-97 period, but their volume on the exchange had
slowed considerably by 1880. 
It was not that trading in bank stocks had stopped, however. Rather, banking equities had
attracted the interest of a different class of brokers and dealers who traded among themselves
and with the public in their offices and at open-air auctions. This over-the-counter market for
bank stocks was sufficiently active to yield regular brokers’ price quotations, which appeared
several times per week in the financial press under the category of “local securities” (along with
utilities, insurance companies, and city debt issues).  And though it is not possible to estimate the
volume of trades in bank stocks that took place in this market by the end of the century, the
regular publication of brokers’ quotations and actual sales suggests that there was considerable
public interest in their price and dividend records.
2.2. Dividends and prices
Fig. 2 presents average annual dividend yields for all New York City banks listed in the
Commercial and Financial Chronicle between 1866 and 1897.  Table A.1 in the Appendix
presents these new data series in tabular form along with the others constructed in this section. 
Table A.2 in the Appendix provides a list of the individual banks and the years for which source
data are available for each. The yields combine the averages of brokers’ bid and ask prices     
4 This timing, which is used throughout the paper, allows information on bank prices and
dividends from the newspapers to match the timing of the annual Comptroller’s reports of
balance sheet items for the national banks in the sample.  In nearly all years, the Comptroller
requested this information within ten days of October 1.  The synchronization is critical for the
econometric analysis presented in Section 4.
     
5 The value weight for a bank in a given year is obtained by dividing book capital by par
value to obtain the number of outstanding shares, and then multiplying by the share price on
October 1. This quantity is then divided by its sum for all banks in the sample in that year.
7
Fig. 2.  Dividend yields for traded New York City Banks, 1866-1897.  Source:
The Commercial and Financial Chronicle, various issues.
published closest to October 1 with any dividends paid over the subsequent one-year period.
4  A
bank qualifies for inclusion in the index by having both a dividend and price reported in a given
year.  Since par and book capital are available for all banks with price observations, the series
weighted by book and market values have the same coverage as the equally-weighted yields.
5
The striking feature of Fig. 2 is the steady decline in dividend yields from more than six      
6 For example, Cowles et al. (1939, table Y-1, p. 270) reports that average dividend yields of all
NYSE stocks fell from 5.81 percent annually in the 1870s to 4.75 percent in the 1880s and to 4.0
percent in the 1890s. The tendency toward lower dividend yields prevailed in other markets as well.
For example, Rousseau (2009) shows that dividend yields of listed manufacturing firms fell by over
50 percent in the Boston market between 1865 and 1897.
     
7 In any given year, the price indexes include firms with observations on or around October 1 of
both the current year and the previous one.  The weighted sum of the percentage changes in price
8
Fig. 3. Price indexes for traded New York City banks, 1866-1897.  Source:  The
Commercial and Financial Chronicle, various issues.
percent in the years immediately following the Civil War to about three percent by the 1890s. At 
first glance, this simply seems to reflect the general decline in dividends for stocks traded on the
NYSE at this time.  Unlike other NYSE stocks, however, the sharp decline in bank dividend
yields between 1877 and 1890 was due to a sustained rise in bank stock prices rather than any
dramatic change in dividend policy.
6  This rise is evident in Fig. 3, which shows equal and value-
weighted price indexes for traded New York City banks.
7  Following a decade with nofor the included firms then serves as a multiplier to update the preceding index number.  The indexes
use 100 as the base value in 1866.  This “chaining” technique resembles that described in Cowles
et al (1939, pp. 17-25).
     
8 The most extreme observations are associated with the Chemical, Fifth Avenue and First
National banks, all of which had par values of $100 and yet were quoted on October 1, 1897 at
prices of $4250, $3300, and $2700 respectively! The Chemical Bank sold at ten times par from
the time of its first appearance in the price indices in 1872, while the prices of the Fifth Avenue
and First National Banks did not reach this level until the late 1880s. Par dividends of 100
percent or more were common for these particular banks.
9
significant advance at the start of the sample, bank stock prices rose more than 65 percent
between 1877 and 1890 on both an equal and book-weighted basis, and nearly doubled when
weighted by market capitalization. Since this was a time of gradual price deflation in the United
States, the rise in bank values is even more dramatic in real terms. This stands in contrast to
movements in the general level of NYSE stock prices, for which the index in Cowles et al.
(1939, chart 7, p. 59) shows no signs of advance between 1880 and 1900.
Fig. 4 presents dividends as percentages of par values, and indicates that the New York 
banks had begun to smooth dividends as early as 1875.  The figure excludes banks with market 
prices that exceed six times par to remove the influence of those that did not adjust their par
values to reflect rising prices of their shares.
8  Restricting the sample in this way does not render
the coverage in Fig. 4 significantly different from that of Fig. 2 until after 1887, when
eliminations, which had averaged only three banks per year between 1866 and 1886,  rose
sharply to an average of 14 banks per year between 1887 and 1897. 
The reluctance of most banks to raise dividends to reflect increases in their stock prices
suggests either uncertainty among bankers about the sustainability of higher dividends or a shift
in the New York market for bank equities that rendered dividends less important for distributing
earnings and signaling future firm prospects. The latter explanation is more likely if  prices were
informative and investors came to expect a deepening equity market to facilitate the liquidation10
Fig. 4. Dividends as percent of par value for traded New York City banks, 1866-
1897. Source:  The Commercial and Financial Chronicle, various issues.
  
of assets at prices that reflected their intrinsic valuations. In this case shareholders might prefer
choosing when to take larger-than-usual profits or losses rather than insisting that banks signal
their condition through more variable dividend distributions. Moreover, given that bank stocks
had become quite profitable investments by the 1880s, with returns outperforming NYSE stocks
by an average of more than 2.8 percent per year in that decade, owners would not wish to alarm
depositors, who had became the main source of the higher earnings, by reducing par dividends. 
2.3 Innovation and sources of depositor confidence
Despite sometimes being characterized as a time of inefficiency and excessive regulation
(e.g., Grant 1992), the New York banking sector adopted many new and innovative practices in
the late 19th century that encouraged deposit growth. By 1866, for example, the clearing house,11
which had been established in 1853, was actively arranging for interbank clearances between
member banks and their correspondents.  The expanded use of clearing facilities reduced
balances in the process of collection and allowed banks to make more productive use of their
funds.  New York’s banks had also accumulated a large share of the nation’s interbank balances.
This made membership in the clearing house all the more important, and nearly all of the city’s
banks had joined by 1870.  Membership may have also sent a positive signal of operational
soundness to potential depositors and those who traded banking equities because member banks
were regularly listed on the stock exchange and in over-the-counter markets. Since the financial
press published weekly balance sheet statements for clearing house members, there was also a
good deal of other public information about their condition that was not as readily obtained for
nonmembers and banks outside of the city.
The rise of a market for call loans after 1880 presented opportunities for the growing
deposit base to fund screened, monitored and easily liquidated loans that in turn facilitated the
transfer of balances from the short-term to the long-term capital market (Sylla 1969).  Call loans
made by New York banks grew from $56 million in 1875 to more than $200 million by 1897,
with their share in total loans rising from one-third to more than one-half over the same period
(Myers 1931, p. 272,  and Annual Comptroller’s Reports). 
New York banks also turned to the market for commercial paper with increasing
frequency to make investments for themselves as well as their correspondents (Davis 1965;
James 1978, pp. 174-98). The market was encouraged by a shift away from insisting upon two-
name paper in favor of accepting single-name paper, which grew in popularity as screening
improved and the more professional nature of the industry made banks less hesitant to liquidate
the paper upon maturity. Though the market for commercial paper was still developing in 1880,12
by 1895 it was already responsible for marked increases in the diversification of bank portfolios
that had reduced the vulnerability of assets to distress liquidations (Myers 1931, p. 326).
Along with commercial paper came the creation of credit departments within New York
banks to advise correspondents and individual clients about direct investments in commercial
enterprises. The Importers’ and Traders’ Bank was the first to establish such a department in
1880 and other banks quickly followed. The credit departments established more objective
means for evaluating the condition of loan recipients to promote more efficient deployment of
their available funds.  By 1894, borrowers were in most cases required to provide a statement of
condition with their loan applications. Since commercial loans were often renewed, monitoring
and the establishment of long-term customer relationships became particularly important for
anticipating financial difficulties and improving recovery rates through planned liquidations and
restructuring.
In 1880 only about half of the national banks in New York City paid interest on deposits,
but this percentage rose rapidly over the next five years so that by 1886 all clearinghouse banks
did. This provided direct motivation for more individuals to place their excess funds with banks.
The innovations described above became important features of New York’s banking
terrain. But the extent to which individual banks adopted them and put them to proficient use
was difficult for individual depositors to discern. Prices, on the other hand, could potentially
convey information about these more subtle sources of profitability that might elude the casual
reader of a bank’s balance sheet. This is especially true if equity holders were better informed
than the general public about the underlying condition of individual banks and traded on this
information. This would allow individual depositors in effect to treat the stock price as a
sufficient statistic for bank soundness. The next section two sections explores this proposition13
using bank-level data.
3. Dynamics of informational transfer and deposit growth 
3.1. Model selection
The preceding discussion points to a process of dynamic adjustment through which
individual depositors gained confidence in banks by observing medium-term stock price
fluctuations and then made deposits based upon these signals.  Evidence that changes in the
prices of individual bank stocks from one year to the next influenced the time path of deposits
for individual banks would offer support for this proposition.  Items on bank balance sheets that
reflected sound management and a record of profitability, such as large surpluses and undivided
profits, might send similar signals to potential depositors.  If depositors did not have ready
access to balance sheets, however, or were unable to interpret fluctuations therein from week to
week, or if balance sheets failed to reflect innovative activities pursued by individual banks, the
sheets themselves would be less important than price signals in attracting deposits. This is even
more likely if depositors recognized that the balance sheets were susceptible to the manipulation
or “window dressing” that was common in 19th century banking practice. Finally, though
deposit growth in a bank could certainly affect its stock price due to scale economies in lending
or some other reason, an inability to identify feedback of this type in the data would bolster
support for prices as a driving force behind the deposit expansion.  
To model this process, I begin by examining dynamic interactions in multivariate systems
that include total deposits (i.e., both individual and interbank), the sum of surplus and undivided
profits, and stock price.  Because surplus and undivided profits are available at the bank level
from the annual Comptroller’s Reports only for nationally-chartered banks and only at the call14
date closest to October 1, the annual observations for prices and deposits are sampled at
approximately the same time. 
A finding that price fluctuations directed the expansion of total deposits, however, by
itself would not shed light on whether individuals or institutions were the primary users of these
signals.  Such a distinction would be particularly important to draw given that balances “due to
other banks” grew from $84 million in 1872  to $140 million in 1885 to an astounding $288
million by 1897 for the national banks in New York City.  These three figures represent 32
percent, 41 percent, and 44 percent of total deposits (Comptroller’s Reports, various years). 
Further, institutional investors would have had better access to both inside information and other
less readily-obtained public information about the soundness of a bank than the typical depositor,
and would be in a better position to monitor the performance of a bank’s assets, particularly
under a banking system where excess balances were often placed as call loans on the stock
market.  This suggests that individual deposits should be more sensitive to stock price changes
than interbank deposits. For this reason, I expand the first set of dynamic systems to alternately
include individual deposits and balances “due to” other banks. 
Fig. 4 showed that New York’s clearinghouse banks had been smoothing dividends by
the 1870s, which suggests that much of their informational content had already been muted,
rendering dividends less important than market prices in building confidence among depositors.
Given the common belief that the stability of dividend streams and fixed par values led 19th
century equities to function essentially like bonds (Baskin 1988, pp. 231-232), I next consider
the possibility that dividends still contained information about a bank’s condition beyond that
conveyed by price in a second set of dynamic systems that use dividend yields in place of
surplus and undivided profits.15
The investigation employs a series of vector autoregressive models using panel data.  I
estimate these systems using an adaptation of the generalized method of moments (GMM)
technique developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) and Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988).  The approach
begins with a dynamic specification in levels and then differences it to eliminate bank-specific
effects such as differences in management styles that by virtue of their likely correlation with the
included system variables would otherwise contribute to omitted variable bias. Of course, to the
extent that prices and balance sheet items are related, collinearity among regressors may reduce
the apparent impact of stock prices from what might be expected in simpler models. The findings 
thus offer conservative estimates of the importance of price discovery in deposit growth  After
reporting the directions of timing relationships in the VARs with F-tests for block exogeneity, I
evaluate the relative size of these effects over time by computing the impulse responses.
3.2. Estimation
In a panel of N banks over T years, the dynamic systems of interest have the form:
(1a,b,c)
where, in the first system discussed below, di,t is deposits of bank i at time t, si,t is the sum of
surplus and undivided profits, pi,t is the average of the bid and ask prices for the bank’s stock, ηi
is a bank-specific fixed effect, Φt is a global time effect, and εi,t is a random disturbance whose     
9 Nickell (1981) derives the bias of the OLS estimator of the coefficient on the lagged
dependent variable under these conditions.  Judson and Owen (1999) show that this bias can be
as much as 20% even as T approaches 30.
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distribution approximates the normal.  The specification of (1) as a set of projection equations
implies that the error terms εi,t are orthogonal to the fixed and time effects as well as lagged
values of the endogenous variables.  The model also includes the standard assumptions that the
errors have a positive variance and are uncorrelated across cross-sectional units and time.  A
fixed effects specification is preferable to a random effects alternative because the ηi are likely to
represent omitted bank-specific characteristics that are correlated with the other explanatory
variables, since the generalized least squares estimator for the random effects model under these
conditions will be biased.  The time effects allow for trending behavior in the system variables.  
Since the least squares dummy variable (LSDV) estimator is known to produce biased
coefficient estimates when applied to equations with lagged values of the dependent variable and
fixed effects in a data set with a small time dimension, the fixed effects are first removed by
differencing.
9  The first equation of the VAR (1a) then becomes
(2)
with the other equations of the system defined similarly.  The form of equation (2) makes clear
the bias that may result from least squares estimation due to the possible correlation between the
lags of the endogenous variables and the errors.  Arellano and Bond (1991) propose a linear
instrumental variables technique that uses the predetermined lags of the system variables as
instruments to exploit a potentially large set of overidentifying restrictions and deliver consistent17
coefficient estimates.  The technique also permits processing of an unbalanced panel.  The VAR
models take the form
(3a,b,c)
where d ), s ), p ), Φ ), and ε ) are first differences, and the errors of the transformed equations satisfy
the  orthogonality conditions
(4)
These conditions imply that under the assumption of serially uncorrelated errors, the vector of
instrumental variables available to identify the parameters of equation (3a) has the form
(5)
Define Zi
* as a block diagonal matrix whose rth block is given by (5) for r=1,...T-2.  Then the
matrix of instrumental variables for each equation of the VAR is Z = (Z1
*,...,ZN
*)´.  Define X as
the N(T-k-1) × q design matrix stacked by cross-sectional unit with typical row
(6)
The GMM estimator for the coefficient vector [α1,..,αk,β1,..βk,γ1,..,γk,φ1,..φT] is then 
(7)
where Y is a (T-lag-1)N × 1 vector of the stacked y )i dependent variables.  AN is given by    
10 This produces the one-step (GMM1) estimator.  A two-step (GMM2) estimator can also be
computed that uses the GMM1 residuals to refine H.  Monte Carlo evidence, however, suggests that
GMM1 in most cases produces less-biased and more efficient estimates than the GMM2 alternative
(e.g., Arellano and Bond 1991; Judson and Owen 1999).
18
(8)
where H is a T-2 square matrix with twos in the main diagonals, minus ones in the first
subdiagonals, and zeros otherwise.
10 
Granger-causal patterns that may arise among the system variables are of particular
interest.  To facilitate this analysis, I construct F-tests for block exclusion based on the difference
in criterion functions of the restricted and unrestricted models of the form 
(10)
where eR and eU are the residuals from the restricted and unrestricted models respectively, r is the
number of restrictions, and obs is the number of observations in the panel.
4. Results and discussion
Table 1 presents estimates from the first set of panel VARs, which include bank stock
prices and the sum of surplus and undivided profits (hereafter referred to as simply “surplus”) in
the baseline specification.  Total deposits and their components – individual deposits and
balances due to other banks  – alternate as the third variable for the systems in the left, center,
and right panels, respectively.  Significance levels of F-tests for the exclusion of each variable
block appear in the lower part of the table.  The likelihood ratio tests described in Holtz-Eakin et
al. (1988) select models with a lag order of two. 19
Table 1
Panel GMM estimates of VAR systems with deposits, surplus and prices of banks traded in the New York stock market, 1866-1897

































































































































































 F-Deposits NA .853 .393 NA .295 .336 NA .780 .702
 F-Surplus .909 NA .050 .849 NA .107 .570 NA .125
 F-Price .001 .000 NA .010 .001 NA .690 .009 NA
 Sargan Test .999 .981 .999 .999 .826 .999 .999 .999 .999
The table reports GMM estimates from VARs corresponding to equations (3a)-(3c) in the text that use two lags of the system variables with
robust standard errors in parentheses. Year effects  are included in the equations but not reported.  * and ** denote statistical at the 10 and 5
percent levels respectively. The system in the left panel includes the total deposits, surplus and undivided profits, and stock price, while the
center and right panels replace total deposits with individual and interbank deposits, respectively. The significance levels of F-statistics for
block exclusion and Sargan tests of the overidentifying restrictions are reported in the lower part of the table.20
Panel A:  System including total deposits, surplus and prices
Panel B:  System including individual deposits, surplus and prices
 
Panel C:  System including balances “due to” other banks, surplus and prices
 
Fig. 5.  Selected impulse response functions.      
11 The plots in Fig. 5 trace the responses of bank deposits and surpluses to one percent changes
in stock prices.  Using Monte Carlo integration, the thick solid lines plot the mean impulse responses
that result from 5,000 random draws from the estimated distribution of the coefficients in each
system. The dashed lines are one standard error bands.  The multiplier responses can be interpreted
as permanent changes in the log level of deposits or surplus over a ten-year horizon.
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In the system reported in the left panel of Table 1, the coefficients on bank stock prices
have a positive sum in the equations that include total deposits and surplus as the independent 
variables, with F-tests that are significant at the 1 percent level.  Total deposits, on the other  
hand, have no significant effect on surplus or prices.  The Sargan tests do not reject the validity
of the instrument set for any of the equations.  The findings are consistent with a link from rising
stock prices to growth in the deposit base. Since stock prices do not respond to fluctuations in
deposits, it is unlikely that the strong response of deposits to price signals is a result of omitted
variables.
The center panel in Table 1 shows that bank prices have a similar effect on the individual
component of deposits.  The system reported in the right panel, however, shows that balances
“due to” other banks are unaffected by fluctuations in bank prices.  This suggests that the effects
of prices on total deposit growth enter through the individual component, and supports the view
that smaller depositors looked to stock prices as important signals of a bank’s soundness.
Fig. 5 presents the cumulative responses of deposits and surplus over a ten-year period to
one-time price shocks in all three systems.
11 As suggested by the F-tests, total deposits and
individual deposits have lasting responses to price signals that are economically important.  For
example, panel A relates an increase in stock price of 1 percent, or about $1 per share for a
typical bank stock with a par value of $100, to an increase of about 0.4 percent in total deposits
and 1 percent in surplus after five years.  For the average bank in the sample, which had $5.422
million in total deposits and $0.6 million in surplus and undivided profits, a $10 change in the
stock price would thus imply an increase of $0.22 million in total deposits and $60,000 in
surplus after five years.  The responses for the system with individual deposits (Panel B) are
qualitatively similar those in Panel A, though the initial response of individual deposits to a price
shock is  sharper.  Panel C, on the other hand, shows no effect of prices on balances “due to”
banks.
In Table 2, annual dividends replace the sum of surplus and undivided profits in each
system.  The findings are similar to those obtained in Table 1, with bank stock prices Granger-
causing total deposits (left panel) at the 5.5 percent level and dividends at the 1 percent level.
The capital market also appears to be more responsive to dividend declarations than the amount
of surplus and undivided profits reported on the balance sheet, with dividends Granger-causing
prices at the 5 percent level. Prices Granger-cause individual deposits and dividends at the 1
percent level (center panel).  Balances “due to” other banks are only marginally responsive to
price changes (right panel).  Further, it is interesting that these interbank balances appear to have
 a negative impact on both future dividends and prices.  This suggests that inflows of the 19th-
century equivalent of modern “hot money” were not necessarily viewed by investors as
conducive to strong bank performance, nor were they associated with increases in dividends.
The impulse responses depicted in Fig. 6 confirm the main results, with the response of
individual deposits to price shocks again much sharper, persistent, and precisely estimated than
the response of interbank balances. The size of the effects on individual deposits (Panel B) are
roughly the same as those obtained for the system with surplus (Fig. 5), while the effects on total
deposits, though still positive and persistent, are somewhat smaller. 23
Table 2
Panel GMM estimates of VAR systems with deposits, dividends and prices of banks traded in the New York stock market, 1866-1897



























































































































































 F-Deposits NA .360 .956 NA .025 .668 NA .007 .006
 F-Dividends .966 NA .020 .505 NA .500 .323 NA .873
 F-Price .055 .000 NA .000 .000 NA .102 .000 NA
 Sargan Test .999 .096 .342 .999 .987 .460 .999 .978 .975
See note to Table 1.  24
Panel A:  System including total deposits, dividends and prices
Panel B:  System including individual deposits, dividends and prices
 
Panel C:  System including balances “due to” other banks, dividends and prices
 
Fig. 6.  Selected impulse response functions.25
5. Conclusion
The rise of deposit banking in the late 19th century United States is often characterized 
as a response to legislative actions and the release of pent-up demand for transactions services.
At the same time, risky portfolio decisions, fraud, and outright defalcation by bank officers
during the “wildcat” and free banking eras of the antebellum period can explain why banks
needed to rely largely on equity capital to support their asset portfolios in the early part of the
century.  I propose that an important shift in banking practices occurred under the National
Banking System that increased public confidence in deposits and encouraged individuals to place
their surplus balances with banks.  
The banks of New York City were the leaders in this new and more professional form of
banking, and ushered it in with a series of innovations that promised more efficient use of
resources and a safer haven for accumulated wealth.  With this professionalism came a leap in
the informativeness of the market for bank stocks.  Although not traded as actively on the New
York Stock Exchange as they had been in the past, the over-the-counter market for these
securities was efficient and the local newspapers quoted bank stock prices on a regular basis. The
prices revealed in this market became reliable sources of information about the soundness of
these institutions. Most important, ordinary depositors – mostly those not actually investing in
bank stocks – used this information to choose among the options for placing their savings.  It is
in this way that the market for bank stocks in New York contributed to increased public
confidence in the banking system and the observed rise in deposits.
The emergence of a significant price elasticity of bank deposits suggests that the New
York equity market had finally come of age by the 1880s. One need not look very far back in
recent history to see that this elasticity is still at work even in the presence of government-26
backed deposit insurance.  An active market for industrial equities was soon to follow by the end
of the 19th century with strong effects on growth in the manufacturing sector. To the extent that
the deposit base fueled commercial loans and investments in this newer class of industrial
securities, the New York market for bank stocks can be viewed even more broadly as a key
component of the vigorous growth experienced by the nation as the 19th century drew to a close. 
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Data Appendix
Table A.1
Price indexes and dividends for bank stocks traded in New York City, 1865-1897
Stock prices Dividend yields Dividends (% of par)













1866 100.0 100.0 100.0  7.46 8.16 6.36  11.31 10.70 10.69 
1867 99.7 100.0 100.1  6.91 7.69 5.95  10.85 10.85 10.69 
1868 103.2 103.3 103.6  6.59 7.15 5.68  10.46 10.13 10.21 
1869 105.4 105.3 106.9  6.21 6.65 5.26  10.37 9.89 10.06 
1870 104.3 103.6 105.8  5.41 6.24    4.78  9.62 9.52  9.71 
1871 105.7 105.4 106.6  5.16 6.01    4.63  9.15 9.00  9.29 
1872 102.6 102.0 103.9  5.03 5.79    4.48  9.22 8.86  9.24 
1873 103.0 101.1 103.2  5.02 5.85 4.60  8.92 8.73  9.20 
1874 103.0 100.6 103.7  4.88 5.68 4.57  8.68 8.40  9.03 
1875 103.6 101.9 105.0  5.78 5.82 4.61  10.38 8.63  9.31 
1876 96.5 94.3 96.4  4.10 4.94  4.25  7.43 7.63 8.48 
1877 92.3 95.0 95.6  3.98 4.97  3.91  6.59 6.98 7.53 
1878 87.8 90.5 89.5  3.41 4.41  3.58  5.71 6.54 6.90 
1879 97.1 100.4 97.0  4.86 5.47  4.69  8.51 7.82 8.96 
1880 106.6 109.6 104.6  4.43 5.13 4.05  7.45 7.70  8.02 
1881 115.5 118.9 112.1  4.31 4.89 3.94  8.14 8.13  8.72 
1882 118.7 121.1 114.2  4.17 4.68 3.83  7.74 8.06  8.13 
1883 121.1 122.0 115.5  4.36 4.72 3.85  8.08 8.34  8.43 
1884 116.8 112.0 108.1  4.10 4.66 3.76  7.88 8.28  8.39 
1885 118.0 110.9 111.3  3.86 4.77 3.82  7.24 7.95  8.08 
1886 142.5 125.9 125.4  3.87 4.56 3.62  7.30 7.75  7.91 
1887 151.2 131.6 130.9  3.51 4.13 3.24  7.74 7.94  8.10 
1888 161.1 136.5 140.7  3.39 3.78 3.23  7.47 7.31  7.76 
1889 190.4 158.5 163.2  3.32 3.69 3.14  7.37 7.29  7.88 
1890 205.6 167.7 172.7  2.92 3.21 2.57  7.58 7.40  8.26 
1891 204.5 160.4 168.1  3.27 3.51 2.73  7.80 7.66  8.38 
1892 213.5 170.5 172.9  3.06 3.62 2.84  8.26 8.01  8.83 
1893 199.8 158.6 161.4  3.01 3.39 2.78  7.93 7.79  8.12 
1894 194.5 159.4 162.3  3.29 3.59 2.94  8.08 7.91  8.89 
1895 201.5 161.7 165.1  3.05 3.31 2.84  8.11 7.73  8.94 
1896 199.9 160.8 162.4  2.94 3.33 2.84  7.74 7.83  8.96 
1897 204.9 168.9 169.3  2.79 3.24 2.82  7.46 7.63  8.82 
  Note: The table presents the data series that underlie Fig. 2, Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 in the text.  30
Table A.2
Sample coverage for New York City banks 




American 1866-97    1866-97    1866-97     none     
American Exchange 1866-97    1866-97    1866-97     1866-97     
Bowery 1872-3,88-97    1866-97    1867-97     1866-88     
Broadway 1866-97    1866-97    1866-97     1866-97     
Butchers' & Drovers' 1866-97    1866-97    1866-97     1866-97     
Central 1866-97    1866-97    1866-97     1866-97     
Chase 1879-97    1879-97    1879-97     1878-97     
Chatham 1866-97    1866-97    1866-97     1866-97     
Chemical 1872-97    1866-97    1866-97     1866-97     
Citizens 1866-97    1866-97    1866-97     1866-97     
City 1866-97    1866-97    1866-97     1866-97     
Columbia 1888-97    1886-97      none        none     
Commerce 1866-97    1866-97    1866-97     1866-97     
Continental 1866-97    1866-97    1866-97     1866-97     
Corn Exchange 1866-97    1866-97    1866-97        none     
East River 1866-97    1866-97    1866-97     1866-97     
Fifth 1872-3,88-97   1865-91,94-7    1883-97     1866-97     
Fifth Avenue 1876-97    1877-97    1880-97        none     
First 1866-97    1866-97    1866-97     1866-97     
Fourth 1866-97    1866-97    1866-97     1866-97     
Fulton 1866-87    1866-87    1866-87     1866-87     
Gallatin 1866-97    1866-97    1866-97     1866-97     
Garfield 1883-97   1880-90,95-7    1883-97     1882-97     
German American 1871-97    1871-97    1870-97        none     
German Exchange 1888-97    1874-97    1881-97       none     
Germania 1872-76,83-97    1870-97    1869-71,81-97       none     
Greenwich 71-73,76-9,84-97    1866-97    1866-97       none     
Grocers' 1868-79    1866-79    1866-79     1866-68     
Hanover 1866-97    1866-97    1866-97     1866-97     
Importers' & Traders' 1866-97    1866-97    1866-97     1866-97     
Irving 1866-97    1866-97    1866-97     1866-97     
Leather
Manufactures'
1867-97    1866-97    1866-97     1866-97     
Lincoln  1888-97    1883-97    1882-97     1882-97     
Manhattan 1866-97    1866-97    1866-97        none     
Manuf. & Merchants' 1866-79    1866-79    1866-79     1866-67     
Marine 1866-79,81-3    1866-83    1866-83     1866-83     
Market 1866-87    1866-87    1866-87     1866-87     
Market & Fulton 1888-97    1888-97    1888-97     1888-97     Table A.2
Sample coverage for New York City banks 





Mechanics 1866-97    1866-97    1866-97     1866-97     
Mech. Bkg. Assoc. 1866-82    1866-79    1866-81     1866-81     
Mechanics' &
Traders'
1869-97    1866-97    1866-97     1866-83     
Mercantile 1866-7,70-97    1866-97    1866-97     1866-97     
Merchants 1866-97    1866-97    1866-97     1866-97     
Merchants' Exchange 1866-97    1866-97    1866-97     1866-97     
Metropolis 1888-97   1874-90,94-7    1885-97        none     
Metropolitan 1866-94    1866-83    1866-84     1866-83     
Nassau 1866-97    1866-97    1866-97        none     
New York 1866-97    1866-97    1866-97        none     
New York County 66-8,71-6,79-97    1866-97    1870-97     1866-97     
New York Exchange 1868-77,81-97    1866-97    1866-97     1866-97     
Ninth 1866-97   1865-91,94-7    1866-97     1866-97     
North America 1866-97    1866-97    1866-97     1866-8,91-7     
North River 1866-90    1866-90    1866-90        none     
Oriental 1866-97    1866-97    1866-97        none     
Pacific 1869-97    1866-97    1866-97     1866-68     
Park 1866-97    1866-97    1866-97     1866-97     
People's 1866-94,96-7    1866-97    1866-97        none     
Phoenix 1866-97    1866-97    1866-97     1866-97     
Produce Exchange 1887-97    1885-97    1896-97        none     
Republic 1866-97    1866-97    1866-97     1866-97     
Seaboard 1888-97    1885-97    1885-97     1888-97     
Second 1871-2,82-97    1866-97    1866-97     1866-97     
Seventh Ward 1866-76,82-97    1866-97    1866-97     1866-97     
Shoe & Leather 1866-97    1866-97    1866-97     1866-97     
St. Nicholas 1866-94    1866-93    1866-93     1866-82     
State of New York 1866-97    1866-97    1866-97     1866-82     
Tenth 1866-77    1866-76    1866-77     1866-77     
Third 1889-97    1866-90    1866-96     1866-96     
Tradesmens' 1866-97    1866-97    1866-97     1866-97     
Union 1866-85,96-7    1866-84,97    1866-85,94-7     1866-84,93-7     
U.S. National 1881-97    1880-96    1881-97     1881-97     
Western 1887-97    1887-97    1887-97     1887-97     
West Side 1888-97    1871-97    1885-97        none     
Note: Coverage for individual banks is based upon information contained in various issues of the
Commercial and Financial Chronicle and Annual Reports of the Comptroller of the Currency.